1. Profit and privilege in the counties, 1229/30

The evolution of the relationship between centre and locality is one of the most important issues in the history of state finance in thirteenth century England. In his latest article Richard Cassidy examines the attempts by the regime of the justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, to raise revenue by reforming the financial terms on which sheriffs agreed to serve in the shires, many of which appear only in the Fine Rolls. By curtailing the farming of the shires and introducing shrieval profits, it hoped to divert income from the sheriffs’ pockets to the Treasury. However, as many sheriffs maintained close ties to the court, central control remained ineffectual and these reforms were ultimately doomed to failure.

⁋1Henry III’s government, in the period when it was dominated by Hubert de Burgh, needed to increase its income, as governments do. One way to do this was to squeeze more revenue out of the counties, by imposing more demanding terms on the sheriffs. This process began in 1224 and continued into the 1230s. For one year in particular, 1229/30, the fine rolls throw some light onto the deals which the government struck with the sheriffs. This information has now been made much more easily accessible by the Henry III Fine Rolls Project.

⁋2Generally, the appointment of sheriffs was recorded in the patent rolls. More often than not, in the 1220s the patent rolls say only that the custody of such a county, and of the castle(s) there, is committed to so-and-so, for as long as it pleases the king. They do not explain how county revenues were to be divided between the Exchequer and the sheriff, who expected to be well rewarded in return for looking after all aspects of local administration. The financial terms were sometimes recorded in the close rolls or the memoranda rolls, and sometimes not at all. In those circumstances they have to be deduced from the sheriffs’ audited accounts in the pipe rolls. This is why the detail available from the fine rolls for 1229/30 is so valuable.

⁋3The fine rolls occasionally note offers of payment in order to be made sheriff, or remain sheriff (Walter de Beauchamp offered six palfreys for Worcestershire, 1 the countess of Salisbury 200 m. for custody of Wiltshire for life). 2 The men of Devon paid 200 m. to have a local man made sheriff; the Exchequer then spent the next year in arguments about payment of the fine, part of which was still outstanding eight years later. 3

⁋4A more reliable way of obtaining cash from the counties was to impose a profit payment. Traditionally, sheriffs had been appointed on the understanding that they would pay a fixed annual sum, the farm, to the Exchequer, and keep for themselves any additional revenue they could extract. As time went by, and inflation and grants reduced the value of the fixed farm, more and more of the county revenue – from the royal demesne, the local courts and customary payments such as sheriff’s aid – ended up in the sheriff’s pocket. In a few counties, the sheriff made an additional fixed annual payment, the increment, but this too declined in real value. Custodian sheriffs reversed the balance: they were paid a fixed sum, 4 and all the additional revenue went to the Exchequer. The revenue over and above the farm was known as profit.

⁋5King John imposed heavy demands on the counties in his pursuit of extra income. 5 That was why the original version of Magna Carta, in 1215, had specifically required that shires, hundreds and so on should remain at the ancient farm, without any increment. 6 This provision disappeared from the re-issues from 1216 onward, leaving the government free to re-introduce increments above the farm, when it became financially expedient and politically acceptable.

⁋6 There was no innovation in financial policy during the years of Henry III’s minority when the Exchequer was concentrating on getting the financial machinery back into action. In the 1222/23 pipe roll, county increments produced £157, with nothing from profits. 7 To put this into context, cash revenue from the county farm in that year was £1,450; total pipe roll revenue was some £13,900, and overall government revenue £15,200. 8 In other words, increments were about 1 per cent of total revenue – a far cry from figures of up to £2,500 a year for profits under John. 9

⁋7There was clearly room for growth in the amount produced from the counties, and the administration under Hubert de Burgh made some efforts to impose profits. By 1229/30, profit payments were contributing just over £500 to the Exchequer. 10 There had clearly been some growth, but nothing like the scale of profit achieved by John. The fine rolls help to explain both how profits were increased, and why the Exchequer did not benefit as fully as it might have done, but they have hitherto been little used by historians of this period.

⁋8Indeed, little has been written about government finance in the late 1220s and early 1230s. David Carpenter and Nick Barratt have covered the period up to 1225; 11 Robert Stacey’s studies only deal in detail with the years from 1236 onward. For the years in between, there were pioneering articles by Mabel Mills eighty years ago, and not a lot since then. 12

⁋9Mabel Mills’s view was that there was a marked change in financial policy in 1223/24, with a wholesale purge of the sheriffs, and profits suddenly restored to their old place. 13 On the other hand, as David Carpenter pointed out, the impact of these changes was limited; custodian sheriffs were appointed, but much of the profit was absorbed by the allowances they were paid for their custody of counties and castles. Several counties were in the hands of curial sheriffs, important figures in the administration who were able to ensure that they enjoyed easy terms. In 1229/30, there was a reversal of policy, with ten sheriffs ceasing to be custodians, and answering for fixed increments rather than profits. 14

⁋10 As it happens, 1229/30 is a year when sheriffs’ appointments are recorded in detail in the fine rolls, which paid them little attention in earlier years (or in the following few years). Leaving aside the anomalous counties, like Cornwall and Rutland in the hands of Earl Richard, and Worcestershire and Westmorland with hereditary sheriffs, there were about 22 sheriffs for the king to appoint (several sheriffs were each responsible for a pair of counties, like Norfolk and Suffolk or Essex and Hertfordshire). The fine rolls record new terms for seven sheriffs in that year. The pipe roll shows how much they actually paid.

⁋11A number of counties had been committed to major curial office-holders, on terms which ensured that they kept for themselves most of the county revenues above the farm. Walter Mauclerc, bishop of Carlisle, was the Treasurer as well as sheriff of Cumberland; he received all the profit of the county and manors for 1229/30. 15 This was a worthwhile amount; in the previous two years, the profit of Cumberland had been £92 and £82, nearly all paid into the Treasury. 16 Now a comparable sum went into the bishop’s pocket. Ralph fitz Nicholas, the steward, was sheriff of Hereford from 1223 until October 1229; he retained custody of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, which he had held since 1224, and in November 1229 was granted all the profits of these counties and manors to sustain himself, paying a fixed increment of 50 m. a year. 17 The pipe roll entry for the profit of the two counties has not been completed, so it appears that he paid nothing. 18 The previous year’s profit was £85. 19 In May 1230, he was pardoned all his debts, including the arrears on his accounts as sheriff of three counties for the preceding year. 20 These debts came to over £270, 21 so it would seem that his appointment as sheriff was of more advantage to him than to the Exchequer.

⁋12Another steward, Godfrey of Crowcombe, was re-appointed sheriff of Oxfordshire. In return for custody of the county and Oxford castle, he was to receive the profit of the county, together with the mill and meadow belonging to the castle. He was also to have custody of Woodstock. In return, he was to pay at the Exchequer 30 m. a year from the profit. 22 He actually paid the 30 m. which was due. 23 This appears to have been a better deal for the Exchequer: the profit of Oxfordshire was about £43 in the previous two years, and Crowcombe received £40 of this for his custody of the county in 1229. 24

⁋13The justice Stephen of Seagrave, who was later to become Justiciar, had accumulated five counties: Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire, since September 1228, where he had already been granted all the profits; Northamptonshire, from November 1228; and in May 1229, Warwickshire and Leicestershire. 25 In November 1229, he was granted the profits of all five counties. 26 The pipe roll records these terms, and shows that he kept all the profit (although he paid the old increment of £40 for Warwickshire and Leicestershire). 27 In 1227/28, before he was appointed to any of these counties, the total profit came to over £200. 28

⁋14Nicholas de Molis was a household knight, who was appointed sheriff of Hampshire in July 1228. For custody of the county and castle, he was granted all the profit of the county, rendering 30 m. each year at the Exchequer. 29 This sum was consumed by his expenditure in the county. This was similar to the situation under his predecessor, the bishop of Salisbury, who reported a profit of £70, which was, conveniently, exactly balanced by payments to the bishop for custody of the county and castles. 30

⁋15These five curial sheriffs had thus accumulated a sizable share of the sheriffs’ posts available, with nearly all of the profits earmarked for their own benefit. Although their appointments referred to them being given custody of the counties, they were not custodians; they were farmers in the traditional style, paying the established farm, plus, in some cases, a fixed annual increment, and keeping the rest of the county revenues for themselves.

⁋16Of course, these curial figures, with important posts at Westminster, did not carry out the sheriff’s duties in person. They had deputies, who presented the county accounts on their behalf. Some of these deputies seem to have been professional local administrators, like de Molis’s deputy in Hampshire, Henry of Bath. In 1229, he had been deputy sheriff of Berkshire; later, he became a sheriff himself, for Gloucestershire then Northamptonshire in 1234, for Surrey and Sussex in 1236.

⁋17It is worth noting that the privileges of curial sheriffs had not yet reached their peak: in 1230, these appointments were all for indefinite terms, for as long as it pleased the king. In 1231 and 1232 Godfrey de Crowcombe was re-appointed for life to Oxfordshire, 31 and Ralph fitz Nicholas to Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire for life, allegedly at the instance of the men of the counties, 32 while Peter de Rivallis was given 13 sheriffdoms, all to be held for life. 33

⁋18Some of the other appointments made in 1229/30 should have been more beneficial for the Exchequer, at least in principle. In Devon, there was a straightforward custodial appointment. Roger la Zouche was to receive £30 for custody of the county in 1228/29, £20 for 1229/30; the rest of the profit was to go to the Exchequer. 34 In the event, he accounted for just over £40 profit, of which he received £30 for custody of the county, and owed the rest. 35

⁋19But that was the only appointment on custodial terms recorded in the fine roll. In Herefordshire, as a sort of mirror image, John of Flegg was granted all the profit, except for payment of 30 m. a year to the Exchequer. 36 This seems a poor deal for the Exchequer, as the profit for the year before was £72, and in the event the 30 m. payment was all consumed in repairs to the hall of the castle. 37 Similarly, Henry of Audley, a Staffordshire landowner, who was active in royal service in that area for many years, was re-appointed to Shropshire and Staffordshire, to receive the profit and pay a fixed 40 m. a year, which he actually paid into the Treasury. 38 This was an improvement on 1229, when the king had granted him all the profit. 39

⁋20Geoffrey of Hatfield had held Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire since 1224, and was re-appointed in October 1228 for two years, to pay a fixed increment of 50 m. a year, which he also paid. 40 He had previously been a custodian, reporting a suspiciously round and consistent profit of 40 m. in both 1228 and 1229. 41

⁋21Much the largest increment was expected from Yorkshire. It was committed to William de Stuteville in May 1229. He was to receive all the profit, and pay 300 m. a year, which had been the fixed payment expected from farmer sheriffs in previous years. 42 He accounted for this sum, part spent locally, and part paid to the Treasury. 43

⁋22In two counties, sheriffs were appointed without their terms being recorded. Robert of Cockfield was appointed to Lincolnshire in October 1229, and succeeded by Walter de Envermeu in April 1230, but neither is mentioned in the fine rolls. 44 Cockfield did not account for profit, while Envermeu accounted for £103 for his half-year. Henry de Scaccario was appointed to Berkshire in November 1229, but unfortunately the fine rolls entry for his appointment is unfinished. 45 He had been sheriff before, in 1223, and before that he had been deputy to Richard of Chilham, when he was sheriff of Berkshire. The pipe roll shows that he accounted for £40 profit, paid into the Treasury. 46

⁋23Several counties carried on unchanged, with existing sheriffs, who had been appointed without their financial arrangements being recorded. In most cases, the patent rolls simply noted that custody of the county had been committed to them at the king’s pleasure. The finances of most of these sheriffs remain opaque. Gloucestershire and Wiltshire did not account in 1229/30. For some counties (Kent, Norfolk and Suffolk, Somerset and Dorset, Worcestershire), the pipe roll leaves a gap where a profit would have been recorded, so we do not know what happened to the profit or how large it might have been. Northumberland shows 20 m. as the profit due, Sussex also 20 m., but both leave gaps where they should record whether the sheriff accounted for that amount, or still owed it. 47 Perhaps no profit was actually due, or the sheriff may have accounted for it later, or it was simply added to the long list of unpaid debts rolled forward year after year.

⁋24Essex and Hertfordshire accounted in the pipe roll for £10 profit, which was said to have been set out in the memoranda for 1228/29, but that year’s memoranda rolls have not survived. 48 It can hardly be a coincidence that custodian sheriffs in the previous two years had each paid £10 into the Treasury, after deducting their expenses. 49 Lancashire had a custodian sheriff, who accounted for £31 profit, of which he took £20 for custody. 50 In Surrey, John of Gatesden accounted for 45 m. profit, 20 m. of which was used for his expenses and payment for custody. 51

⁋25Overall, the picture that emerges is one of fairly loose control over the sheriffs, particularly the curial sheriffs, who were given free rein to help themselves to whatever profit they could extract from their counties. Where comparisons are possible, it seems that the sheriffs of 1229/30 held on to more of the profit than the custodians of the previous few years. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure how large this profit was, or how it was made up, as few sheriffs’ accounts survive.

⁋26It is also clear that many of the custodians behaved more like farmers. Some paid the Exchequer the traditional farm and declared a suspiciously round profit figure, in the same manner as a farmer sheriff’s increment (in 1228, for example, Lincolnshire, Wiltshire, Devon, Essex, Cambridgeshire, Dorset and Surrey). Others declared a profit figure, which was conveniently balanced by their expenses, so that the Exchequer received only the farm (in 1228, Hereford and Hampshire). And for Walter de Beauchamp in Worcestershire, 1230 was the sixth successive year in which he had simply not accounted for the profit.

⁋27The central administration under Hubert de Burgh was clearly not taking a firm grip on local government. It treated many counties as a means of rewarding court officials, rather than producing revenue for the king’s treasury. The rolls do not record the terms on which many sheriffs were appointed, which raises the question of how the Exchequer was expected to audit their accounts. Where terms are recorded, or can be deduced from the audited accounts in the pipe rolls, it seems that the return to custodians and county profits had been undertaken half-heartedly. The fine rolls show it being partially abandoned, without any apparent improvement to government revenue. The administration was just a few years away from the complete financial collapse which brought about the fall of de Burgh. 52

Footnotes

1.
CFR 1229–30, nos. 38, 39. Back to context...
2.
CFR 1230–31, no. 148. There is more detail in Patent Rolls of the reign of Henry III AD 1225–1232 (London 1903), p. 431. Back to context...
3.
CFR 1224–25, no. 369, then CFR 1225–26, nos. 130, 131, 251, 260. The outstanding amount, £24 10s, is in Memoranda Rolls 16–17 Henry III, ed. R. Allen Brown (London 1991), no. 2111. This debt from 1225 can be traced in the intervening memoranda rolls (e.g. TNA E 159/9 memoranda roll 1227/28, m. 7; E 368/11 memoranda roll 1229/30, m. 17). There is thus no evidence for a second fine to have a local sheriff, as J.R. Maddicott suggested on the basis of Thomas Madox’s quotation of the 1230 memoranda roll: see J.R. Maddicott, ‘Magna Carta and the local community’, Past and Present 102 (1984), p. 29. Back to context...
4.
At least in principle. Under King John, payment was not always forthcoming, and it seems that allowances for John’s custodians were neither as frequent nor as generous as they were in the 1220s: David Carpenter, ‘The decline of the curial sheriff in England, 1194–1258’, reprinted in his The Reign of Henry III (London 1996), p. 160, n. 5. Back to context...
5.
See Brian E. Harris, ‘King John and the sheriffs’ farms’, EHR 79 (1964), pp. 532-42; Nick Barratt, ‘The revenue of king John’, EHR 111 (1996), pp. 835–55. Back to context...
6.
Chapter 25 of Magna Carta 1215; see J.C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd edition (Cambridge 1992), p. 456 for text and pp. 336–37 for discussion. Also William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta, 2nd edition (Glasgow 1914), pp. 317–21, and Carpenter, ‘The decline of the curial sheriff’, p. 160, and p. 153 n. 2. Back to context...
7.
Calculated from the 1223 pipe roll: The great roll of the pipe for the seventh year of the reign of King Henry III, ed. Adrian Jobson & C.F. Slade (Pipe Roll Society NS LVI, London 2008). Back to context...
8.
David Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (London 1990), pp. 416, 413; Nick Barratt, ‘Introduction’, Receipt rolls for the seventh and eighth years of the reign of King Henry III (Pipe Roll Society, London 2007), p. xiii. There are differences between their figures, but not significant ones in this context. Back to context...
9.
Mabel H. Mills, ‘Experiments in Exchequer procedure (1200–1232)’, TRHS 4th series vol. 8 (1925), p. 160. Back to context...
10.
Calculated from the 1230 pipe roll: The great roll of the pipe for the 14th year of the reign of King Henry III, ed. Chalfant Robinson (Pipe Roll Society NS IV, Princeton 1927). Hereafter, Pipe roll 1230. Back to context...
11.
Carpenter, Minority, esp. pp. 413–17; Barratt, ‘Introduction’, Receipt rolls; Robert C. Stacey, Politics, policy and finance under Henry III 1216–1245 (Oxford 1987). Back to context...
12.
Mills, ‘Experiments in Exchequer procedure’, pp. 151–70; ‘The reforms at the Exchequer (1232–1242)’, TRHS 4th series vol. 10 (1927), pp. 111–33. Back to context...
13.
Mills, ‘Experiments in Exchequer procedure’, pp. 167–68. Back to context...
14.
Carpenter, ‘The decline of the curial sheriff’, pp. 160–61. This account is followed in Stacey, Politics, policy and finance, p. 33. Back to context...
15.
Memoranda roll 1230, E 368/11, m. 4d; Close rolls of the reign of Henry III AD 1227–1231 (London 1902), p.60. Back to context...
16.
E 372/72, pipe roll 1228, rot. 15d; E 372/73, pipe roll 1229, rot. 15. Back to context...
17.
CFR 1229–30, nos. 10, 110; Memoranda roll 1230, m. 3; CR 1227–1231, p. 282. Back to context...
18.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 75. Back to context...
19.
Pipe roll 1229, rot. 5. Back to context...
20.
CR 1227–1231, pp. 411–12. Back to context...
21.
Pipe roll 1229, rot. 15d. Back to context...
22.
CFR 1229–30, no. 260. For Godfrey, see David Carpenter’s Fine of the Month for January 2007, ‘The fine rolls, Godfrey of Crowcombe and the Oxfordshire offices’. Back to context...
23.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 246. Back to context...
24.
Pipe roll 1228, rot. 12; Pipe roll 1229, rot. 16d. Back to context...
25.
CFR 1227–28, no. 308; PR 1225–32, pp. 231, 251. Back to context...
26.
CR 1227–1231, p. 259; Memoranda roll 1230, m. 4d. Back to context...
27.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 119. Back to context...
28.
Pipe roll 1228, rots. 3 & 9; Pipe roll 1229, rot. 8 (figure for two years, halved for the estimation of the total). Back to context...
29.
PR 1225–32, p. 198; CFR 1229–30, nos. 30, 50. Back to context...
30.
Pipe roll 1228, rot. 7. Back to context...
31.
PR 1225–32, p. 455. Back to context...
32.
PR 1225–32, p. 472. Maddicott suggested that this was an example of the desire for local autonomy (‘Magna Carta and the local community’, p. 29). Although fitz Nicholas had local links (he had been steward to the earl of Derby – see S.D. Church, The household knights of King John (Cambridge 1999), pp. 30–31), it seems more plausibly an example of the egregious privileges granted to those currently in favour at court. Back to context...
33.
PR 1225–32, pp. 488–89. Back to context...
34.
CFR 1229–30, nos. 187, 195. Back to context...
35.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 13. Back to context...
36.
CFR 1229–30, no. 10. Back to context...
37.
Pipe roll 1229, rot. 5; Pipe roll 1230, p. 216. Back to context...
38.
CFR 1229–30, no. 10; Pipe roll 1230, p. 216. Back to context...
39.
Pipe roll 1229, rot. 15. Back to context...
40.
CFR 1228–29, no. 435; Pipe roll 1230, p. 56. Back to context...
41.
Pipe roll 1228, rot. 9; Pipe roll 1229, rot. 8d. Back to context...
42.
PR 1225–32, p. 248; CFR 1229–30, no. 109. Back to context...
43.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 267. Back to context...
44.
PR 1225–32, pp. 275, 337. Back to context...
45.
PR 1225–32, p. 315; CFR 1229–30, no. 25. Back to context...
46.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 164. Back to context...
47.
Pipe roll 1230, pp. 260, 237. Back to context...
48.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 143. Back to context...
49.
Pipe roll 1228, rot. 8; Pipe roll 1229, rot. 14. Back to context...
50.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 330. Back to context...
51.
Pipe roll 1230, p. 7. Back to context...
52.
Carpenter, ‘The fall of Hubert de Burgh’, pp. 50–51; Stacey, Politics, policy and finance, pp. 36–37. Back to context...